I. Introduction

1.
Turkey appeals from certain issues of law and legal interpretations in the Panel Report,
Turkey -Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products (the "Panel Report"). 1 The Panel was established to consider a complaint by India regarding quantitative restrictions introduced by
Turkey on imports of Indian textile and clothing products.
2.
On 6 March 1995, the Turkey-EC Association Council adopted Decision 1/95 2 , which sets out the rules for implementing the final phase of the customs union between Turkey and the European Communities. Article 12(2) of this Decision states:
In conformity with the requirements of Article XXIV of the GATT Turkey will apply as from the entry into force of this Decision, substantially the same commercial policy as the Community in the textile sector including the agreements or arrangements on trade in textile and clothing.
In order to apply what it considered to be "substantially the same commercial policy" as the European
Communities on trade in textiles and clothing, Turkey introduced, as of 1 January 1996, quantitative restrictions on imports from India on 19 categories of textile and clothing products. appellant's submission. 5 On 20 August 1999, India filed an appellee's submission. 6 On the same day, Hong Kong, China; Japan; and the Philippines filed third participant's submissions. 5. The oral hearing in the appeal was held on 14 September 1999. The participants and third participants presented oral arguments and responded to questions put to them by the Members of the Division hearing the appeal.
II. Arguments of the Participants
A.
Claims of Error by Turkey -Appellant
6.
Turkey appeals the Panel's finding that Article XXIV of the GATT 1994 does not allow it to introduce, upon the formation of its customs union with the European Communities, quantitative restrictions on textile and clothing products which are inconsistent with Articles XI and XIII of the GATT 1994 and Article 2.4 of the ATC.
7.
Turkey argues that the Panel erred in presuming the existence of a conflict between, on the one hand, Articles XI and XIII of the GATT 1994 and Article 2.4 of the ATC, and, on the other, Article XXIV of the GATT 1994. The Panel's reasoning was based on the incorrect presumption that the quantitative restrictions introduced by Turkey in the framework of its customs union with the European Communities were incompatible with Turkey's WTO obligations. 4 Panel Report, para. 10.1. 32. In addition to responding to Turkey's general and specific claims of legal error, India makes a number of general observations. First, the argument that Article XXIV of the GATT 1994 can provide a justification for quantitative restrictions has never been accepted under the GATT 1947.
Second, the agreement establishing a customs union between Turkey and the European Communities was drafted on the assumption that Article XXIV does not justify the introduction of new quantitative restrictions on imports of textile and clothing products. This agreement explicitly recognized the possibility that Turkey would not be able to impose quantitative restrictions and that, therefore, a system of certificates of origin would continue to be applied on these products. Third, the agreement between Turkey and the European Communities provides for the formation of a customs union only at a future date, and therefore constitutes, at most, an interim agreement for the formation of a customs union. To realize the objectives of this interim agreement, Turkey did not have to impose the same restrictions on imports of textiles and clothing as imposed by the European Communities.
III. Arguments of Third Participants
A. Hong Kong, China
33.
Hong Kong, China argues that Article XXIV is best characterized as a specific provision of the GATT 1994 under which WTO Members are permitted, subject to compliance with certain conditions, to form customs unions or free trade areas that may depart from certain other provisions of the WTO Agreement.
34.
In interpreting Article XXIV:5, Hong Kong, China notes that it is important to examine the context provided by Article XXIV:4. This paragraph states that the purpose of a customs union or free-trade area is "not to raise barriers to the trade of other contracting parties with such territories."
Similarly, the Understanding on Article XXIV states that parties to regional trade agreements "should to the greatest possible extent avoid creating adverse effects on the trade of other Members." 
43.
We note that, in its findings, the Panel referred to the chapeau of paragraph 5 of Article XXIV only in a passing and perfunctory way. The chapeau of paragraph 5 is not central to the Panel's analysis, which focuses instead primarily on paragraph 5(a) and paragraph 8(a). However, we believe that the chapeau of paragraph 5 of Article XXIV is the key provision for resolving the issue before us in this appeal. In relevant part, it reads:
10 Panel Report, para. 9.86.
11 Ibid., paras. 9.188 and 9.189. Accordingly, the provisions of this Agreement shall not prevent, as between the territories of contracting parties, the formation of a customs union …; Provided that: … (emphasis added)
44.
To determine the meaning and significance of the chapeau of paragraph 5, we must look at the text of the chapeau, and its context, which, for our purposes here, we consider to be paragraph 4 of Article XXIV.
45.
First, in examining the text of the chapeau to establish its ordinary meaning, we note that the chapeau states that the provisions of the GATT 1994 "shall not prevent" the formation of a customs union. We read this to mean that the provisions of the GATT 1994 shall not make impossible the formation of a customs union. 12 Thus, the chapeau makes it clear that Article XXIV may, under certain conditions, justify the adoption of a measure which is inconsistent with certain other GATT provisions, and may be invoked as a possible "defence" to a finding of inconsistency.
13
46. Second, in examining the text of the chapeau, we observe also that it states that the provisions of the GATT 1994 shall not prevent "the formation of a customs union". This wording indicates that
Article XXIV can justify the adoption of a measure which is inconsistent with certain other GATT provisions only if the measure is introduced upon the formation of a customs union, and only to the extent that the formation of the customs union would be prevented if the introduction of the measure were not allowed.
47.
It follows necessarily that the text of the chapeau of paragraph 5 of Article XXIV cannot be interpreted without reference to the definition of a "customs union". This definition is found in paragraph 8(a) of Article XXIV, which states, in relevant part:
12 "Prevent" is defined as "make impracticable or impossible by anticipatory action; stop from happening." The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (Clarendon Press, 1993), Vol. II, at 2348. 13 We note that legal scholars have long considered Article XXIV to be an "exception" or a possible "defence" to claims of violation of GATT provisions. An early treatise on GATT law stated: "[Article XXIV] establishes an exception to GATT obligations for regional arrangements that meet a series of detailed and complex criteria. A customs union shall be understood to mean the substitution of a single customs territory for two or more customs territories, so that Thus, we agree with the Panel that the terms of sub-paragraph 8(a)(i) offer "some flexibility" to the constituent members of a customs union when liberalizing their internal trade in accordance with this sub-paragraph. 15 Yet we caution that the degree of "flexibility" that sub-paragraph 8(a)(i) allows is limited by the requirement that "duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce" be "eliminated with respect to substantially all" internal trade.
49. Sub-paragraph 8(a)(ii) establishes the standard for the trade of constituent members with third countries in order to satisfy the definition of a "customs union". It requires the constituent members of a customs union to apply "substantially the same" duties and other regulations of commerce to external trade with third countries. The constituent members of a customs union are thus required to apply a common external trade regime, relating to both duties and other regulations of commerce.
However, sub-paragraph 8(a)(ii) does not require each constituent member of a customs union to apply the same duties and other regulations of commerce as other constituent members with respect 14 Panel Report, para. 9.148.
to trade with third countries; instead, it requires that substantially the same duties and other regulations of commerce shall be applied. We agree with the Panel that:
[t]he ordinary meaning of the term "substantially" in the context of subparagraph 8(a) appears to provide for both qualitative and quantitative components. The expression "substantially the same duties and other regulations of commerce are applied by each of the Members of the [customs] union" would appear to encompass both quantitative and qualitative elements, the quantitative aspect more emphasized in relation to duties. 16 
50.
We also believe that the Panel was correct in its statement that the terms of subparagraph 8(a)(ii), and, in particular, the phrase "substantially the same" offer a certain degree of "flexibility" to the constituent members of a customs union in "the creation of a common commercial policy." 17 Here too we would caution that this "flexibility" is limited. It must not be forgotten that the word "substantially" qualifies the words "the same". Therefore, in our view, something closely approximating "sameness" is required by Article XXIV:8(a)(ii). We do not agree with the Panel that:
… as a general rule, a situation where constituent members have "comparable" trade regulations having similar effects with respect to the trade with third countries, would generally meet the qualitative dimension of the requirements of sub-paragraph 8(a)(ii).
18
Sub-paragraph 8(a)(ii) requires the constituent members of a customs union to adopt "substantially the same" trade regulations. In our view, "comparable trade regulations having similar effects" do not meet this standard. A higher degree of "sameness" is required by the terms of sub-paragraph 8(a)(ii).
51.
Third, in examining the text of the chapeau of Article XXIV:5, we note that the chapeau states that the provisions of the GATT 1994 shall not prevent the formation of a customs union "Provided that". The phrase "provided that" is an essential element of the text of the chapeau. In this respect, for purposes of a "customs union", the relevant proviso is set out immediately following the chapeau, in Article XXIV:5(a). It reads in relevant part:
with respect to a customs union …, the duties and other regulations of commerce imposed at the institution of any such union … in respect of trade with contracting parties not parties to such union … shall not on the whole be higher or more restrictive than the general incidence of the duties and regulations of commerce applicable in the constituent territories prior to the formation of such union …; 52. Given this proviso, Article XXIV can, in our view, only be invoked as a defence to a finding that a measure is inconsistent with certain GATT provisions to the extent that the measure is introduced upon the formation of a customs union which meets the requirement in sub-paragraph 5(a)
of Article XXIV relating to the "duties and other regulations of commerce" applied by the constituent members of the customs union to trade with third countries.
53.
With respect to "duties", Article XXIV:5(a) requires that the duties applied by the constituent members of the customs union after the formation of the customs union "shall not on the whole be higher … than the general incidence" of the duties that were applied by each of the constituent members before the formation of the customs union. Paragraph 2 of the Understanding on Article XXIV requires that the evaluation under Article XXIV:5(a) of the general incidence of the duties applied before and after the formation of a customs union "shall … be based upon an overall assessment of weighted average tariff rates and of customs duties collected." 19 Before the agreement on this Understanding, there were different views among the GATT Contracting Parties as to whether one should consider, when applying the test of Article XXIV:5(a), the bound rates of duty or the applied rates of duty. This issue has been resolved by paragraph 2 of the Understanding on Article XXIV, which clearly states that the applied rate of duty must be used.
54.
With respect to "other regulations of commerce", Article XXIV:5(a) requires that those applied by the constituent members after the formation of the customs union "shall not on the whole be … more restrictive than the general incidence" of the regulations of commerce that were applied by each of the constituent members before the formation of the customs union. Paragraph 2 of the Understanding on Article XXIV explicitly recognizes that the quantification and aggregation of regulations of commerce other than duties may be difficult, and, therefore, states that "for the purpose of the overall assessment of the incidence of other regulations of commerce for which quantification and aggregation are difficult, the examination of individual measures, regulations, products covered and trade flows affected may be required." 19 Paragraph 2 of the Understanding on Article XXIV further states that "this assessment shall be based on import statistics for a previous representative period to be supplied by the customs union, on a tariff-line basis and in values and quantities, broken down by WTO country of origin." 20 In paragraph 43 of its appellant's submission, Turkey argues that this provision must be interpreted as allowing the constituent members of a customs union to introduce GATT/WTO inconsistent quantitative restrictions upon the formation of the customs union. We see no basis for such an interpretation.
… that the effects of the resulting trade measures and policies of the new regional agreement shall not be more trade restrictive, overall, than were the constituent countries' previous trade policies. 21 and we also agree that this is:
an "economic" test for assessing whether a specific customs union is compatible with Article XXIV. The contracting parties recognize the desirability of increasing freedom of trade by the development, through voluntary agreements, of closer integration between the economies of the countries parties to such agreements. They also recognize that the purpose of a customs union or of a free-trade area should be to facilitate trade between the constituent territories and not to raise barriers to the trade of other contracting parties with such territories.
57.
According to paragraph 4, the purpose of a customs union is "to facilitate trade" between the constituent members and "not to raise barriers to the trade" with third countries. This objective demands that a balance be struck by the constituent members of a customs union. A customs union should facilitate trade within the customs union, but it should not do so in a way that raises barriers to trade with third countries. We note that the Understanding on Article XXIV explicitly reaffirms this purpose of a customs union, and states that in the formation or enlargement of a customs union, the constituent members should "to the greatest possible extent avoid creating adverse affects on the trade of other Members". 23 Paragraph 4 contains purposive, and not operative, language. It does not set forth a separate obligation itself but, rather, sets forth the overriding and pervasive purpose for Article XXIV which is manifested in operative language in the specific obligations that are found elsewhere in Article XXIV. Thus, the purpose set forth in paragraph 4 informs the other relevant paragraphs of Article XXIV, i ncluding the chapeau of paragraph 5. For this reason, the chapeau of paragraph 5, and the conditions set forth therein for establishing the availability of a defence under Article XXIV, must be interpreted in the light of the purpose of customs unions set forth in paragraph 4. The chapeau cannot be interpreted correctly without constant reference to this purpose. 58. Accordingly, on the basis of this analysis of the text and the context of the chapeau of paragraph 5 of Article XXIV, we are of the view that Article XXIV may justify a measure which is inconsistent with certain other GATT provisions. However, in a case involving the formation of a customs union, this "defence" is available only when two conditions are fulfilled. First, the party claiming the benefit of this defence must demonstrate that the measure at issue is introduced upon the formation of a customs union that fully meets the requirements of sub-paragraphs 8(a) and 5(a) of Article XXIV. And, second, that party must demonstrate that the formation of that customs union would be prevented if it were not allowed to introduce the measure at issue. Again, both these conditions must be met to have the benefit of the defence under Article XXIV.
59.
We would expect a panel, when examining such a measure, to require a party to establish that both of these conditions have been fulfilled. It may not always be possible to determine whether the second of the two conditions has been fulfilled without initially determining whether the first condition has been fulfilled. In other words, it may not always be possible to determine whether not applying a measure would prevent the formation of a customs union without first determining whether there is a customs union. In this case, the Panel simply assumed, for the sake of argument, that the first of these two conditions was met and focused its attention on the second condition.
60.
More specifically, with respect to the first condition, the Panel, in this case, did not address the question of whether the regional trade arrangement between Turkey and the European Communities is, in fact, a "customs union" which meets the requirements of paragraphs 8(a) and 5(a)
of Article XXIV. The Panel maintained that "it is arguable" that panels do not have jurisdiction to assess the overall compatibility of a customs union with the requirements of Article XXIV. 24 Communities from meeting the requirements of sub-paragraph 8(a)(i) of Article XXIV, and consequently from forming a customs union. We recall our conclusion that the terms of subparagraph 8(a)(i) offer some -though limited -flexibility to the constituent members of a customs union when liberalizing their internal trade. Turkey preferred instead to introduce the quantitative restrictions at issue.
63.
For this reason, we conclude that Turkey was not, in fact, required to apply the quantitative restrictions at issue in this appeal in order to form a customs union with the European Communities.
Therefore, Turkey has not fulfilled the second of the two necessary conditions that must be fulfilled to be entitled to the benefit of the defence under Article XXIV. Turkey has not demonstrated that the formation of a customs union between Turkey and the European Communities would be prevented if it were not allowed to adopt these quantitative restrictions. Thus, the defence afforded by
Article XXIV under certain conditions is not available to Turkey in this case, and Article XXIV does not justify the adoption by Turkey of these quantitative restrictions.
VI. Findings and Conclusions
64.
For the reasons set out in this report, the Appellate Body concludes that the Panel erred in its legal reasoning by focusing on sub-paragraphs 8(a) and 5(a) and by failing to recognize the crucial role of the chapeau of paragraph 5 in the interpretation of Article XXIV of the GATT 1994, but upholds the Panel's conclusion that Article XXIV does not allow Turkey to adopt, upon the formation of a customs union with the European Communities, quantitative restrictions on imports of 19 categories of textile and clothing products which were found to be inconsistent with Articles XI and XIII of the GATT 1994 and Article 2.4 of the ATC.
65.
We wish to point out that we make no finding on the issue of whether quantitative restrictions found to be inconsistent with Article XI and Article XIII of the GATT 1994 will ever be justified by Article XXIV. We find only that the quantitative restrictions at issue in the appeal in this case were not so justified. Likewise, we make no finding either on many other issues that may arise under 33 Article 12(3) reads as follows:
Until Turkey has concluded these arrangements, the present system of certificates of origin for the exports of textile and clothing from Turkey into the Community will remain in force and such products not originating from Turkey will remain subject to the application of the Communities Commercial Policy in relation to the third countries in question. (emphasis added)
